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Introduction 27 
The geographical expansion of animal diseases traditionally thought of as exotic to the 28 
European continent, for example, African swine fever (ASF), and lumpy skin disease 29 
(LSD), are causing increasing concern to European Union (EU) member states (MS). The 30 
steady movement of these diseases across European boundaries has required the EU to 31 
put surveillance activities and mitigation programmes in place to prevent further spread. 32 
Despite these preventive controls which significantly reduce the likelihood of spread, rare 33 
geographical random jumps of pathogens can, and do, occur with the consequence that 34 
introduction of an emerging disease into an EU MS may go undetected for a certain period 35 
of time during which silent spread could occur. This has been demonstrated with the 2006 36 
Bluetongue virus (BTV) serotype 8 appearance in the Netherlands [1] and the 2016 37 
diagnosis of besnoitiosis in Ireland [2, 3].  38 
For the United Kingdom (UK), situated on the north western perimeter of Europe, national 39 
surveillance of emerging exotic diseases has been assisted by the predominantly east to 40 
west/south to north direction of spread allowing the progressive reporting of outbreaks in 41 
individual MSs to be monitored and continually reassessed. The data generated by these 42 
outbreaks can be used in risk assessments with particular emphasis on the probability of 43 
introduction from continental Europe to the UK [4]. The island status of the UK needs to be 44 
accounted for when assessing the probability of disease incursion with the surrounding 45 
water boundary likely to affect pathogen incursion via routes such as vector movements [4] 46 
and wild animals [5]. 47 
Lumpy skin disease came to particular prominence in 2016 as an exotic disease that 48 
emerged as a major threat to European cattle populations. It is a viral disease of cattle 49 
(Bos indicus and B. taurus) and water buffalo (Bubalus bubalis) and is categorised as a 50 
notifiable disease by the World Organisation for Animal health (OIE) [6]. The disease is 51 
present in most, if not all, African countries and is now considered endemic in Turkey [7]. 52 
Since 2012, LSD has spread from the Middle East to south east Europe, affecting EU MSs 53 
(Greece and Bulgaria) and several other countries in the Balkans. This spread has been 54 
rapid, possibly aided by civil unrest and the breakdown of veterinary services in countries 55 
such as Iraq and Syria [8]. Since 2015 in south east Europe there have been over 7,600 56 
outbreaks with 12,800 affected animals [7]. Indirect production losses are incurred by 57 
control and eradication measures and restrictions/total ban of international trade of live 58 
cattle and their products.  59 
Lumpy skin disease has never been reported in the UK but, given the current situation 60 
within the EU, assessing the probability of incursion is important to inform surveillance 61 
activities and national policy regarding risk mitigation. This qualitative assessment focuses 62 
on the probability of LSD virus (LSDV) introduction into the UK within the time period June 63 
2017 to June 2018. The probability of onward transmission, were disease incursion to 64 
occur within the UK, was also assessed. Factors with high uncertainty were identified to 65 
emphasise their impact on the assessment conclusions and future research requirements. 66 
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Such research would assist risk assessors in making more robust conclusions for national 67 
preparedness and mitigation strategy prioritisation. 68 
Material and Methods 69 
Risk Questions: 70 
The risk questions to be addressed were: 71 
• What is the probability of introduction of LSDV into the UK within the next year*? 72 
• What is the probability of onward transmission of LSDV within the UK, should it be 73 
introduced within the next year*? 74 
*’within the next year’ is here on in interpreted as being from 1st June 2017 to 1st June 2018 75 
Risk framework: 76 
The approach used was based on the framework set out by the OIE [9]. The variables (i.e. 77 
probabilities and their associated uncertainties) are expressed qualitatively as negligible, 78 
very low, low, medium, high and very high [10, 11] and defined as: negligible, so rare that 79 
it does not merit to be considered; very low, very rare but cannot be excluded; low, event 80 
is rare but does occur; medium, event occurs regularly; high, event occurs very often; and 81 
very high, event occurs almost certainly. 82 
 83 
Risk Pathway: 84 
The risk pathway highlighting the potential routes of introduction of LSDV into the UK 85 
within the next year is shown in Figure 1. Disease introduction was defined as the 86 
presence of an LSDV positive vector or animal/animal product in the UK and included the 87 
probability of detection at post-import testing. Onward transmission to UK cattle, given 88 
introduction has occurred, is described in the second pathway (Figure 2) using the outputs 89 
from Figure 1 (infected live animals, contaminated animal products and infected vectors) 90 
as sources of LSDV. The primary routes of introduction and onward transmission 91 
considered were based on literature reviews and expert opinion. 92 
The qualitative estimates for the combined probability of introduction and onward 93 
transmission for individual routes i.e. live animals, animal products and vectors were 94 
derived using a  matrix approach as described previously [12]. 95 
 96 
 97 
 98 
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Parameterisation 99 
Data used to estimate the pathway probabilities are summarised in Table 1. Data used for 100 
these estimates can be found in the Appendix. An overview of the data required for each 101 
route is presented. 102 
Live animals  103 
This route considers animals in which LSDV infection has been documented i.e. domestic 104 
cattle and water buffalo. For completeness exotic wildlife such as African buffalo, 105 
wildebeest and impala are also assessed acknowledging the very limited detection of 106 
LSDV seropositive results in documented studies [13-15]. The probability that an infected 107 
live animal is consigned (i.e. intra-community trade) or exported (i.e. from outside the EU) 108 
to the UK was estimated from the number of animals arriving from each country of origin 109 
and the presence of LSDV infection in those countries. These data were then combined 110 
with the probability of the infected animal surviving the journey from its country of origin 111 
and the probability of it being detected at destination, depending on the incubation period, 112 
clinical infection and post-import test sensitivity. Countries for which post-import testing 113 
within the UK is required for compliance checks and those in which an LSD outbreak has 114 
been reported to the OIE for the years 2015 – 2016 are referred to as ‘at risk’ countries 115 
hereon in. Both illegal and legal trade were assessed. The final estimate is the probability 116 
that an infected animal enters the UK from any other country of origin. 117 
The estimate of the probability that onward transmission of LSDV could occur within the 118 
UK from the introduction of an infected animal considers transmission via local competent 119 
vectors, directly via animal to animal or indirectly via fomites, iatrogenic, germplasm, feed 120 
or water (Figure 2). Onward transmission from an infected animal depends upon the 121 
animal remaining sub-clinically infected or differentially diagnosed whilst still being 122 
viraemic for a sufficient time period for transmission to occur. Duration of viraemia, 123 
percentage of sub-clinically infected animals and virus survival in the environment were, 124 
therefore, all considered. 125 
In general, there are very few non-EU countries which are approved for the export of cattle 126 
to the European Union. The list of countries is in Regulation (EU) 206/2010 and includes 127 
Canada, Chile, Switzerland, Greenland, Iceland and New Zealand for bovidae. Otherwise, 128 
exotic ungulates may be moved between approved bodies (e.g. zoos and collections) only 129 
if they are risk assessed and suitable testing and quarantine procedures are in place.  130 
Animal products 131 
The probability that an LSDV infected product enters the UK from any affected country 132 
was estimated by combining the probabilities of an infected product being consigned or 133 
exported to the UK, survival time of the virus within the product and whether or not it would 134 
be detected at destination. The animal products considered were germplasm; hides and 135 
skins; meat and milk products. The assessment considers the presence of contamination 136 
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in the product at source and any reduction in viral load which may occur during the time 137 
taken for travel to the UK including any processing effects. Both illegal and legal trade/ 138 
imports were assessed. 139 
Onward transmission of LSDV from animal products was considered to be either via a 140 
native competent vector or using infected germplasm as the source. Data on UK vector 141 
competency and survival and transmissibility of LSDV in germplasm were used to estimate 142 
the probability. 143 
Vectors 144 
Whether or not an infected vector could be introduced to the UK would depend upon the 145 
type of vector and the environmental conditions. It is currently unknown which vectors are 146 
involved in transmission of LSDV and whether transmission is mechanical, biological or 147 
both. Because of this knowledge gap, high uncertainty surrounds how far vectors can 148 
travel e.g. different modes of transport could potentially be involved [16-18], and for how 149 
long virus can survive in/on the vector. It was assumed that only vectors in countries 150 
where infected cattle were reported, or in their bordering countries, were infected. 151 
Onward transmission via a vector could be possible either through an incoming infected 152 
vector contacting susceptible UK cattle or a native competent vector contacting an infected 153 
animal or contaminated animal product. The probability was estimated using data on UK 154 
vector competence and UK cattle density. 155 
Results 156 
Probability of introduction 157 
The probability of introduction of LSDV into the UK via each route considered was 158 
calculated by combining the relevant steps in the risk pathway (Figure 1) as described 159 
previously [12]. The probability was estimated to be very low for vectors and both illegal 160 
and legal trade of livestock, skins/hides and meat/milk products. All other routes were 161 
considered to have a negligible probability of introduction (Table 2). 162 
No animals were consigned from ‘at risk’ countries (see Table 1) to the UK in the last 12 163 
months. In order for the UK to legally trade an infected animal, the disease would need to 164 
have spread undetected into one of the UK’s trading partners and would, therefore, in all 165 
likelihood, be at a very low prevalence. The numbers of animals traded by the UK from the 166 
MSs concerned, were also relatively low (See Appendix). It is likely that the highest risk 167 
would be from breeding or production stock rather than slaughter animals as they would 168 
have a longer period of time to make further contacts with other live animals or vectors. 169 
Based on these considerations, the probability that an infected animal is legally consigned 170 
to the UK within the next year was considered to be very low. Although LSD has been 171 
endemic in Africa for decades no actual cases have been reported in wildlife and 172 
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prevalence by antibody detection has been reported to be very low [13-15] suggesting that 173 
exotic animals (i.e. non-livestock) are unlikely to be important in the epidemiology of LSD. 174 
The import from third countries of such animals is covered by strict regulations under EU 175 
rules and the risk of introduction via the exotic animal route was thus estimated as 176 
negligible. 177 
The probability that an infected animal survives the journey from the country of origin to 178 
the UK was considered to be high given the relatively low mortality rate but the probability 179 
that an infected animal is not detected on arrival was considered to be very low for ‘at risk’ 180 
countries due to the post-import testing regime in place. For animals consigned from non-181 
risk countries the probability was assessed as medium assuming that only 50% of infected 182 
animals show clinical symptoms [19] and that no testing on arrival would occur.  183 
No bovine germplasm (semen or embryos) were traded from ‘at risk’ countries during the 184 
year 2016. It is likely that once an LSD outbreak has been confirmed in a herd all animal 185 
products, including semen, would be destroyed. The probability of LSDV infected 186 
germplasm being legally consigned to the UK was therefore considered to be negligible. 187 
The probability of any virus surviving in semen was, however, estimated to be high as it 188 
was assumed that semen will be transported as frozen straws thereby preserving any virus 189 
within it [20]. 190 
For the year 2016 the number of intra EU imports of hides into the UK is not known as they 191 
are not recorded in TRACES, but instead rely on commercial documentation. Imports from 192 
third countries (i.e. those outside of the EU) were from Australia, China and the USA. The 193 
probability of untreated LSD infected animal hides or skins being legally exported to the 194 
UK from a third country was therefore considered to be very low. Untreated products 195 
consigned from within the EU must only originate from a country which is approved for the 196 
import of fresh or frozen meat or products for human consumption [21] and be destined for 197 
an approved processing plant within the EU. Otherwise, skins and hides must be 198 
processed in an EU approved establishment in the country of origin. Skin/hides are likely 199 
to be transported to the UK via trucks and ships with temperatures below 37oC and in the 200 
dark; hence it is likely that little or no inactivation of the virus would occur during transport 201 
[22] particularly in those products which do not undergo specific inactivating treatment [19]. 202 
The probability of virus surviving in infected hides/skins was therefore assessed to be high 203 
but the probability of not being detected on import was considered to be low due to the 204 
identifiable nodules and scabs on the products. 205 
Concerning milk and milk products, while there is some experimental evidence that 206 
conditions equivalent to the low temperature / long time pasteurisation method inactivate 207 
capripoxvirus (62oC for 30 minutes) [23, 24] there is no available data on pasteurisation at 208 
72oC; furthermore, the presence of fat, protein and other solids in milk may protect the 209 
virus thereby decreasing the inactivation rate compared to that of virus in a laboratory 210 
buffer. There is therefore insufficient evidence on both the presence of virus in milk and 211 
whether pasteurisation inactivates LSD virus to a negligible level. However, the OIE code 212 
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[25] recommends that pasteurisation of milk or any combination of control measures with 213 
equivalent performance as described in the Codex Alimentarius Code of Hygienic Practice 214 
for Milk and Milk Products [26] is a suitable prerequisite to import of these products. There 215 
is no public health risk of LSD from meat products and therefore the trade in meat is not 216 
subject to risk management procedures. The probability of meat/milk products infected 217 
with LSDV being consigned to the UK was therefore considered to be very low with the 218 
probability of LSDV surviving in these products also assessed as very low assuming that 219 
all dairy products would be pasteurised for human consumption in accordance with the 220 
OIE recommendations. The probability of infected germplasm or meat and milk products 221 
not being detected on arrival was considered to be high as no physical signs of 222 
contamination will be evident and no post-import tests are currently carried out. 223 
In order to estimate the probability of introduction of LSDV into the EU via the illegal 224 
movement of animals, the number of animals that need to be moved to have a probability 225 
of introduction of LSDV into Europe of greater than 0.95 was calculated to be above 1,300 226 
(for country seroprevalence equal to 30%), or above 7,800 (for country seroprevalence 227 
equal to 5 %) i.e. a large and likely improbable number of animals [27]. The logistics and 228 
costs involved of illegally transporting cattle from mainland Europe to the UK is another 229 
mitigating factor against this event occurring. Contradicting this is the high chance of virus 230 
survival and the fact that no post-import testing would be carried out on illegally 231 
transported animals. As such the probability that an LSDV infected livestock animal is 232 
illegally transported to the UK was considered to be very low. The probability is reduced to 233 
negligible for exotic animals due to the assumption that non-livestock animals are not 234 
important in terms of LSDV transmission and do not act as a reservoir of disease. 235 
For illegal products, the probability of infected germplasm being consigned to the UK was 236 
considered to be negligible due to the availability of cheap and health tested products 237 
legally available in the UK. The probability for meat and milk products was assessed as 238 
very low although it is unknown whether large scale consignments might occur or whether 239 
illegal trade or imports may only be occurring as goods for personal consumption. The 240 
probability of illegally importing untreated hides/skins was also estimated as very low. 241 
Although these products can be of high value, thereby increasing the likelihood of them 242 
being imported as a commodity for onward sale, it was assumed that hides spoiled by skin 243 
lesions would not be selected for export. The probability that animal products illegally 244 
consigned from the EU into the UK are not detected was assessed as high for germplasm 245 
and meat/milk products and medium for hides/skins. The latter has a slightly higher 246 
likelihood of being detected due to the size of the product and the probability that they will 247 
be shipped as bulk imports rather than personal imports. There are no checks carried out 248 
on passengers and trade products for intra EU trade.  249 
The possibility of long term virus survival in vector populations cannot be excluded with 250 
certainty [28]. Vectors have been previously implicated in transboundary cases of LSD e.g. 251 
the first cases in Greece were suspected of coming from Turkey via vector movement [29]. 252 
However, these are neighbouring countries unlike the UK and mainland Europe which are 253 
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separated by a ~ 33 km stretch of water. Modelling of LSDV transmission suggests that 254 
vector borne transmission is responsible for short distance transmission only [30]. For this 255 
reason the probability that an infected vector will reach the UK successfully within the next 256 
year was assessed as being very low. 257 
Uncertainty associated with the probability of introduction of LSD virus into the UK 258 
Qualitative uncertainty scores for the routes of introduction are shown in Table 3. The 259 
highest levels of uncertainty were associated with the introduction of LSDV via legal and 260 
illegal meat and milk products and via vectors. High uncertainty surrounds all of these 261 
estimates due to the lack of robust scientific evidence and lack of data on the numbers 262 
involved. The uncertainty associated with the vector route is high due to the unknown 263 
vector species involved (and therefore its associated mode of entry to the UK) and 264 
whether biological transmission or only mechanical transmission is involved which will 265 
influence virus survival on or within the vector. 266 
A level of medium uncertainty was derived for the trade of infected livestock to the UK as 267 
the complete movement history of the animals is unknown and the time between disease 268 
incursion within a country and disease detection, which is dependent on the clinical signs 269 
and the methods of surveillance and post-import test sensitivity, was unknown and likely to 270 
be variable. During this window movement of potentially infected animals could occur. The 271 
uncertainty score for exotic animals, however, was considered to be very low due to the 272 
robust scientific data available on the very low levels of natural infection in this population.  273 
The lack of data on the number of hides traded around the EU and undergoing different 274 
preservation treatments and the effect of those treatments on LSDV makes it difficult to 275 
estimate virus survival. An assessment of medium uncertainty for the virus surviving the 276 
journey on these products was therefore assumed. However, there was low uncertainty 277 
concerning the probability of not being detected on arrival as nodules and scabs are likely 278 
to be evident on the product thereby identifying infected items. 279 
Uncertainty surrounding the probability that an LSDV infected livestock animal or exotic 280 
animal is illegally imported to the UK was considered to be low. Conversely, a high level of 281 
uncertainty was associated with the probability of animal products being illegally imported 282 
into the UK due to the unknown number of illegal consignments. 283 
Probability of onward transmission 284 
The probability of onward transmission of LSDV, assuming introduction to the UK, and the 285 
associated uncertainty for all of the assessed routes is shown in Table 4. The probability of 286 
direct animal to animal transmission was considered to be very low as the basic 287 
reproduction number (R0) of this mode of transmission has been calculated to be 0.36 [30], 288 
i.e. infection is unlikely to be able to spread in a population. Studies have demonstrated 289 
direct transmission from infected animals to be inefficient with lack of spread from infected 290 
animals to naïve animals housed together [31]. Transmission of this type would also be 291 
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dependent on a situation when high densities of cattle are in close contact e.g. communal 292 
grazing or cattle markets which have been associated with the occurrence of LSD. For 293 
exotic animals, there are very low numbers of seropositive animals reported in the 294 
literature [13-15] and serological positivity does not necessarily imply that the virus 295 
replicates in the animals and is excreted; thus, they may not be able to transmit the virus 296 
and represent an end-point for disease [27]. The probability of onward transmission of 297 
LSDV from exotic animals was therefore assessed as being negligible. 298 
If infected cattle remain undetected, further iatrogenic spread may occur if unhygienic 299 
practices (e.g. use of contaminated hypodermic needles and surgical equipment) takes 300 
place [32]. It is assumed that in the UK good veterinary practice is undertaken for both 301 
herd wide testing and vaccination campaigns requiring the use of needles; the probability 302 
of iatrogenic transmission was therefore assumed to be very low. 303 
For other live animal routes, only transmission of LSDV via semen has been 304 
demonstrated; disease itself was not transmitted [33]. The probability of onward 305 
transmission via germplasm was therefore assumed to be very low. The probability of 306 
onward transmission via fomites, food or water was assumed to be low due to the lack of 307 
evidence of this transmission occurring but acknowledging the potential of the virus to 308 
survive for long periods at ambient temperatures (for up to 6 months if protected from 309 
sunlight), and the fact it survives well at cold temperatures.  310 
The probability of a competent vector contacting an LSDV infected skin/hide or meat 311 
product was considered to be negligible. Lumpy skin disease virus is considered to be 312 
transmitted mainly through haematophagus vectors which do not bite bloodless hides or 313 
skins; therefore, even if the virus on or in insufficiently treated hides was imported, further 314 
transmission would not take place [27]. Meat is not considered to be a significant risk for 315 
transmission for LSDV [28] and untreated hides/skins go straight to a designated 316 
processing plant for treatment; the transmission route between an infected meat product or 317 
hide/skin and a susceptible animal was considered unlikely [6]. 318 
The probability that a native vector would contact an LSDV infected animal was 319 
considered to be high depending on the competence of native vectors in the UK for 320 
transmitting the virus and the co-occurrence of such a vector and infected host. Whilst the 321 
competency of vectors in the UK is currently unknown the fact that the disease has moved 322 
steadily up from southern Africa through many different climatic zones involving potentially 323 
many different vectors suggests that it is also likely to be transmitted by vectors present in 324 
the UK. The probability of an infected vector contacting a susceptible host and initiating 325 
onward transmission was also assessed as high. Proximity to livestock, warm 326 
temperatures and vector abundance are among the main risk factors for LSD spread. The 327 
R0 value induced by indirect transmission has been estimated at 15.7. Sensitivity analysis 328 
showed that this result was robust to a wide range of assumptions regarding mean and 329 
standard deviation of incubation period and regarding the existence of sub-clinically 330 
infected cattle [30]. This indirect transmission was assumed to be vector mediated and the 331 
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efficiency of transmission of an infected vector to a naïve animal was therefore assumed to 332 
be high.  333 
Uncertainty associated with the probability of onward transmission of LSD virus within the 334 
UK 335 
Very little is known about the probability of transmission of LSDV via fomites, feed or water 336 
and, as such, uncertainty associated with this route of transmission is high. Transmission 337 
via these routes could occur under any situation when high densities of cattle come in 338 
close contact but in the natural setting it is difficult to differentiate this type of indirect 339 
transmission from vector mediated transmission within a herd. Similar high uncertainty was 340 
associated with onward transmission via direct animal to animal contact and germplasm 341 
due to lack of robust scientific evidence of natural transmission in the field and the need for 342 
more extensive experimental studies.  343 
Regarding vector mediated routes, there is high uncertainty surrounding the  ability of an 344 
incoming infected vector to initiate onward transmission due to lack of robust evidence on 345 
which vector species are involved in transmission and, therefore, what effect temperature 346 
and other environmental conditions would have upon efficiency of transmission. There was 347 
considered to be slightly less uncertainty (medium) about whether or not vectors native to 348 
the UK would be competent to transmit LSDV due to the speed with which LSD has moved 349 
geographically suggesting many different vectors are competent transmitters. 350 
When the probabilities of introduction and onward transmission were combined [12], exotic 351 
animals, germplasm, hides/skins and meat/milk products were considered to have an 352 
overall negligible probability with regards to  disease incursion (Table 5). For livestock and 353 
vectors the overall probability was considered to be very low as dictated by the very low 354 
probability of introduction into the UK despite the high probability of onward transmission 355 
should an introduction event occur. As stated previously, these probabilities are associated 356 
with often high uncertainty due to lack of robust scientific evidence. 357 
Discussion 358 
This risk assessment has estimated the probability of incursion into, and onward 359 
transmission of LSDV within, the UK. In doing so it has highlighted those knowledge gaps 360 
with significant impact on the uncertainty associated with the overall conclusions. Whilst 361 
the assessment was UK centric the knowledge gaps are generic and relevant to the 362 
uncertainty surrounding the probability of introduction and spread in any geographical 363 
region. Overall the probability of LSDV being introduced to the UK was considered, at 364 
most, to be very low for all routes with the exception of exotic animals and germplasm 365 
(negligible). The probability of onward transmission was considered highest for vector 366 
mediated routes either via contact of an infected vector with a susceptible cattle or contact 367 
of a competent native vector with infected cattle. The probability of onward transmission is, 368 
however, likely to be reduced once the first case of LSD has been detected if vaccination 369 
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is undertaken. Risk-based vaccination, to avert the spread of the disease, may even be 370 
carried out in the UK if LSD is detected in mainland northern Europe as has recently been 371 
recommended with regard to countries that have not yet been affected by LSD but are 372 
considered at risk [34]. 373 
For the live animal import or trade route, it was considered that entry of disease would 374 
require infected animals entering the UK from a country which was currently not classed 375 
as ‘at risk’ and where no UK post-import testing for LSDV is required. Such countries 376 
would be those which had previously imported or consigned animals from an ‘at risk’ 377 
country or those that were in close enough proximity to infected countries whereby virus 378 
could have entered their cattle populations as a result of transboundary vector and/or 379 
cattle movements. Infection and exportation of an animal to the UK would rely on a series 380 
of events whereby infection goes undetected and the animal selected for export comes 381 
from the same herd (or neighbouring herd to allow for short distance vector transmission) 382 
which had previously imported an animal from an ‘at risk’ country. This very low risk is, 383 
however, likely to be mitigated by the regulated vaccination of cattle carried out by 384 
countries currently affected by LSDV and their neighbouring countries. 385 
In the unlikely event that the disease spreads undetected into western continental Europe 386 
(to Germany or the Netherlands for example), the likelihood of consigning an infected 387 
animal into the UK from a country that is erroneously believed to be uninfected, could 388 
increase due to subclinical or incubation period infection. Using the European Food Safety 389 
Authority (EFSA) model, if seroprevalence of LSDV in the country of origin was 5%, but 390 
currently undetected, the import of 140 or 7,809 animals from that country would give a 391 
probability of introduction of 5% or 95% respectively. The highest number of cattle 392 
imported into the UK during 2016 was 4,074 from the Republic of Ireland (ROI). According 393 
to the same EFSA model, if seroprevalence of LSDV was 5% and undetected in the ROI 394 
then the probability of introduction  into the UK would be ~ 75% using 2016 trade data [27]; 395 
this scenario is, however, extremely unlikely due to the control and prevention measures 396 
put in place by EU MSs.  397 
Within the UK, preliminary outbreak assessments are undertaken by the Government on 398 
notification of a disease outbreak from the EU or OIE. These assessments indicate the 399 
threat of the disease incident at present and in the future and are used to inform the 400 
Governments’ advice and consideration of preventative controls. For LSD, however, 401 
medium to high uncertainty surrounds the probability of introduction to the UK via several 402 
of the routes assessed here. These are the initial stages of the risk pathway and therefore 403 
all assessments made consequential to these probabilities are underpinned by high 404 
uncertainty. Previous risk assessments have so far assumed 2 routes of spread, that is, 405 
direct and indirect but they can only assume that the more rapid local spread is vector 406 
borne and longer distance transmission is direct spread due to cattle movements [30, 35]. 407 
The accuracy of the calculation of R0 for LSDV, i.e. the number of cases one infected case 408 
can generate over the course of its infectious period, could be greatly improved if the 409 
vectors involved in transmission were definitively identified. This would allow for vector 410 
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abundance to be taken into account [36], the influence of the extrinsic incubation period (if 411 
any) [37] and the ratio of host to vector species when calculating R0 [38]. 412 
This risk assessment acknowledges that the current understanding of the epidemiology of 413 
LSD and the potential pathways for the introduction and further dissemination has a 414 
number of limitations. Therefore, any inferences made have varying degrees of uncertainty 415 
which needs to be acknowledged. The key uncertainties associated with the transmission 416 
of LSDV have been summarised elsewhere [27], but how they impinge on risk assessment 417 
is highlighted here. The highest uncertainty was found to be associated with the current 418 
data available on vector species, transmission rates via all routes and illegal trade of 419 
animal products. The matrix method used here to calculate the probabilities of introduction 420 
and onward transmission dictates that the product of two probabilities is, at most, the 421 
minimum of the two values [12]. If, therefore, the lowest probability within a pathway has 422 
high uncertainty associated with it the overall probability calculated may be artificially 423 
skewed towards underestimation.  424 
The results here show that for the period June 2017 to June 2018 the overall probability of 425 
introduction and onward transmission of LSDV to the UK is very low. However, perhaps of 426 
more value are the uncertainty estimates surrounding the probabilities of the pathway 427 
stages and on which research should be targeted to make conclusions more robust. 428 
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Table 1: Summary of data used to estimate probabilities of Lumpy skin disease virus introduction and 454 
onward transmission (see supplementary information for further details) 455 
Data requirement Estimate Source 
‘At risk’ countries (countries with an OIE 
reported LSD outbreak 2015 – 2016) 
African continent countries, Albania, Armenia, 
Bahrain, Bulgaria, Former Republic of Macedonia, 
Georgia, Greece, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, 
Montenegro, Oman, Russian Federation, Saudi 
Arabia, Samoa, Serbia, Turkey 
Wahid (OIE) 
Countries consigning cattle to UK 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands,  Norway, 
Poland, Republic of Ireland, Spain, Switzerland 
Traces 
EU MSs which consign cattle from LSD 
affected countries 
Austria, Belgium, Czech republic, Germany,  Italy, 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain 
Eurostat 
Livestock animals considered Cattle; water buffalo   
Seroprevalence of LSDV in cattle 23% - 31% by virus neutralisation test [39] 
‘At risk’ countries: UK post-import testing 
required 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Hungary, Romania, 
Slovakia, Slovenia 
Animal and Plant Health 
Agency Operations 
manual 
Import test used Real time PCR  [40] 
Import test sensitivity/specificity 63 DNA copies/100%  [40] 
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Mortality rate 0.4% - 10%  [25, 27] 
Morbidity rate (intraherd) 10% - 50%  [7] 
Incubation period 28 days  [25] 
Duration of viraemia 1-12 days  [28] 
Presence of clinical signs 50% [19] 
Seroprevalence of LSDV in exotic animals 0.69%  by virus neutralisation test  [13-15] 
Survival time of virus in semen 42 days (viral DNA 159 days) (longer if frozen)  [41] 
Third countries which export germplasm 
to the UK 
Australia; United States of America Traces 
Viral levels in skin lesions 8.1 – 8.3 log10 PFU/g  [42] 
Survival time of virus in skins/hides >18 days  [19] 
Third countries which export hides/skins 
to the UK 
Australia; China; USA Traces 
Survival time of virus in meat/milk 
products 
Unknown  - 
Vector species involved Unknown   
Vector spread rate of LSDV <10–15 km/week [35] 
Virus survival time in vector 2-6 days  [43, 44] 
R0 of direct animal to animal transmission 0.36  [30] 
Environmental survival 6 months at ambient temperature  [27] 
Virus susceptibility 
No significant reduction at pH 6.6 - 8.6 for 5 days @ 
37oC 
 [27] 
R0 of indirect transmission (vector?) 15.7  [30] 
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Table 2: Probability of introduction of Lumpy skin disease virus into the United Kingdom within the next year 478 
(1st June 2017 to 1st June 2018) via animals /animal products and vectors 479 
Probability   Qualitative scores  
Legal Livestock Exotic animals 
Germplas
m 
Hides/skins 
Meat and 
milk 
products 
Vector 
Probability consigned 
to the UK  
Very low  Negligible  Negligible  Very Low  Very low  Very low  
Probability infected 
animal/virus survives 
journey 
High  High  High  High  Very low  Very low  
Probability not 
detected on arrival 
At risk 
country: 
Very low      
Non-risk 
country: 
Medium  
Very low  High  Low  High  N/A 
Probability of 
introduction of 
animal/animal 
product/vector infected 
with LSDV 
Very low Negligible Negligible  Very Low  Very low Very low 
Illegal Livestock Exotic animals 
Germplas
m 
Hides/skins 
Meat and 
milk 
products 
Vector 
Probability consigned 
to the UK 
Very low  Negligible (Low) Negligible  Very Low  Very low  N/A 
Probability infected 
animal/virus survives 
journey 
High  High  High  High  Very low  N/A 
Probability infected 
animal/product 
reaches UK 
undetected 
Low  Low  High  Medium  High  N/A 
Probability of 
introduction of 
animal/animal product 
infected with LSDV 
Very low  Negligible Negligible Very Low Very low N/A 
16 
 
 480 
 481 
 482 
 483 
 484 
 485 
 486 
 487 
 488 
 489 
 490 
Table 3: Uncertainty surrounding the estimates for probability of introduction of Lumpy skin disease virus into 491 
the United Kingdom within the next year 492 
Probability Uncertainty scores 
Legal Livestock 
Exotic 
animals 
Germplasm Hides/skins 
Meat and milk 
products 
Vector 
Probability consigned to the UK  Medium Very low Low Medium High High 
Probability infected animal/virus 
survives journey 
Low High  Medium Medium High High 
Probability not detected on arrival 
At risk country: 
Very low      
Very low  Low Low  Low N/A 
Non-risk country: 
High 
Illegal Livestock 
Exotic 
animals 
Germplasm Hides/skins 
Meat and milk 
products 
Vector 
Probability consigned to the UK Low Low Very low Medium High N/A 
Probability infected animal/virus 
survives journey 
Low Medium Medium Medium High N/A 
Probability infected animal/product 
reaches UK undetected 
Medium Medium High High High  N/A 
 493 
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 496 
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Table 4: Probability of onward transmission of Lumpy skin disease virus within the United Kingdom during 509 
the next year (June 2017 to June 2018) via animals /animal products and vectors 510 
Probability Qualitative score  Uncertainty 
Live animal 
 
 
Direct animal to animal 
transmission  
Very low High 
Iatrogenic transmission  Very low  Low 
Transmission via fomites, 
feed or water  
Low  High 
Transmission via 
germplasm  
Very low  High 
Transmission via native 
competent vector biting 
infected animal  
High  Medium 
Animal product 
 
 
Transmission via 
competent vector biting 
animal product 
Negligible  Very low 
Transmission via 
germplasm  
Very low  High 
Vector 
 
 
Transmission via contact 
with susceptible host  
High  High 
 511 
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Table 5: Overall risks for main routes of potential introduction and further onward transmission of Lumpy skin 523 
disease virus within the United Kingdom 524 
Route 
Probability of 
LSDV 
introduction 
Probability of LSDV 
onward transmission 
Overall 
probability 
Livestock Very low High Very low 
Exotic animals Negligible Negligible Negligible 
Germplasm Negligible Very low Negligible 
Hides/skins Very low Negligible Negligible 
Meat and milk 
products 
Very low Negligible Negligible 
Vectors Very low High Very low 
 525 
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 540 
 541 
 542 
 543 
 544 
 545 
 546 
 547 
LSD infection in exporting 
country 
Probability infected 
vector 
survives journey 
Probability 
infected vector 
exported to UK 
Probability infected 
animal legally/illegally 
exported to the UK 
Probability infected 
animal product 
legally/illegally 
exported to the UK 
Probability infected 
animal survives 
journey 
Probability virus in 
infected product 
survives journey 
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Figure 1: Risk pathway for the probability of introduction of Lumpy skin disease virus into 560 
the United Kingdom within the next year. Exporting country here refers to both European 561 
Union and third countries. 562 
 563 
 564 
 565 
 566 
 567 
 568 
 569 
 570 
 571 
 572 
 573 
Contaminated animal 
product 
Probability of 
transmission via 
native competent 
vector  
Probability of 
transmission via 
infected germplasm  
Probability of 
contact with 
susceptible host  
Probability of direct 
animal to animal 
transmission 
Probability of 
iatrogenic 
transmission 
Probability of 
transmission via 
fomites, feed or water 
Infected vector Infected live animal 
Probability of onward 
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Figure 2: Risk pathway for the onward transmission of Lumpy skin disease virus should 579 
the disease enter the United Kingdom within the next year 580 
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